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RETRIBUTION AND REDEMPTION IN THE OPERATION OF
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
ELIZABETH RAPAPORT*

No matter how firm a stand he may appear to take, no matter what
he may think and argue to the contrary, no man with a heart that
pulses rich red blood, no man of real human sympathies can be
thrown in direct contact with an unfortunate brother in his hour of
distress without responding to those noble instincts which centuries
of Christian teachings have implanted in his breast.
-

Governor West of Oregon1

In pardoning a criminal, the official.., is not forgiving his own
debtor, one who has trespassed against him, but a public debtor
whose trespass has impaired or endangered the happiness of the
whole community .... If I were conscious that I had ever advised
the president to exercise clemency for no better reason than
because I felt sorry for the prisoner or those interested in him, I
should feel that my conduct had differed, indeed, in degree, but not
in kind, from what it would have been had I given such advice for a
bribe in money.
2
-U.S. Attorney General Bonaparte
Make a long-time man feel bad ....
-Refrain from a traditional chain-gang song
INTRODUCTION

The power to grant clemency, to remit punishment and pardon
offenses, is ancient and recognized today in almost every nation.' In
the United States, the clemency power is vested by state and federal
* Visiting Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law, and Professor of Law,
University of New Mexico. I thank Nancy Hollander, Martin Golding, and the law and divinity
students in my clemency seminar at Duke University in the Fall 1999 semester for valuable
discussions. My thanks to Heidi Feldman for her editorial insight. I thank Will Farris and Chris
Trump for able research assistance in the summer of 1999 and the academic year 1999-2000,
respectively.
1. James D. Barnett, The Grounds of Pardon, 17 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 490, 494
(1927) (quoting Governor West of Oregon).
2. Id. at 493-94 (quoting U.S. Attorney General Bonaparte).
3. See Leslie Sebba, The Pardoning Power-A World Survey, 68 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 83, 85-110 (1977);

see also KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE,
MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1989); Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained:

Wresting the PardoningPower from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569 (1991).
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constitutions in the executive. 4 It is a discretionary power, almost
entirely unreviewable by courts, and subject, typically, only to such
standards or procedures as the state or national executive chooses to
impose upon itself.
The institution of clemency has attracted the critical attention of
retributivists who advocate the reform of clemency in keeping with
that criminal justice philosophy which has so thoroughly triumphed
over the rehabilitation model in the past quarter of a century.
Contemporary retributivists, "neo-retributivists ''5 as I shall call them,
argue in support of replacing executive discretion with substantive
standards that would establish entitlement to clemency in those
prisoners who satisfied the appropriate normative standards. They
argue that the clemency power should be used only to rectify unjust
punishment, to free the innocent or those of uncertain guilt, and those
whose sentences are excessive when measured against their offenses
and culpability. Neo-retributivists would deprive executives of
discretion in order to avoid arbitrary or corrupt decisions, whether
motivated by venality or misplaced compassion.
In this Article, my goal is to raise doubts about the adequacy of
the neo-retributive theory of clemency and stimulate reappraisal and
development of what I will call the "redemptive" perspective. To this
end I will present an exposition and critique of neo-retributive theory
of clemency. The retributivist view of clemency and of criminal
justice generally is reductionist or monodimensional: Punishment's
justification, its mete and measure, is just desert, which is due each
duly convicted offender. No other goals, including utilitarian goals of
deterrence, entitle the state to impose punishment nor to increase or
decrease its magnitude -although the accomplishment of these social
objectives is endorsed by retributivists, provided justice is not
compromised to achieve them. A richer account of clemency, more
respectful of and grounded in history and tradition, recognizes that
criminal justice has a complex set of goals. These prominently
4. The most recent study of executive clemency procedures in the 50 states and at the
federal level is Clifford Dome & Kenneth Gewerth, Mercy in a Climate of Retributive Justice:
Interpretationsfrom a National Survey of Executive Clemency Procedures, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 413 (1999); see also NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASS'N CTR. FOR
POLICY RESEARCH, GUIDE TO EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY AMONG THE AMERICAN STATES
(1988) (containing information about the practice of clemency and clemency procedures as well
as an earlier study of clemency procedures) [hereinafter NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASS'N];
NATIONAL CTR. FOR THE STATE COURTS, CLEMENCY: LEGAL AUTHORITY, PROCEDURE,
AND STRUCrURE (Samuel P. Stafford ed., 1977).
5. For a discussion of neo-retributivism, see infra Part II. The neo-retributivist theory of
executive clemency has been advanced by MOORE, supra note 3, and Kobil, supra note 3.
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include both retribution and social utility-general and specific
deterrence and the efficient use of public resources-but are not
exhausted by either or both. There are also what I will call
"redemptive"
goals of criminal justice: rehabilitation and
reconciliation of the offender, victim, and community. Thus, while
there is clearly a sense in which justice and clemency-as-retributivelyundeserved-lenity are antithetical, a richer account of criminal justice,
rich enough to reflect our traditions and practices prior to the neoretributive retreat, finds a place for clemency-as-lenity.
The concept of clemency is as contested as the appropriate use of
the power of clemency. Attending to the meaning of the term
"clemency," and the cognate terms "mercy" and "forgiveness,"
provides a starting point for examination of the claims of neoretributivism. It will help clarify the subject matter under discussion,
but will not decide the issue between retributive and redemptive
theories of clemency. "Clemency," like "mercy," characterizes a
judgment or action when a person with the power to exact
punishment or payment declines to exact all or some of what he or
she is entitled to exact. 6 No wrongdoer or debtor has a right to such
lenity-where a right to demand relief exists, clemency or mercy is
neither asked nor can be granted. While the two terms have
overlapping meanings, it is helpful to use the term clemency to denote
only relief granted after the punishment is initially determined. I will
restrict my use of the term "clemency" to instances where an official
with the power to remit punishment exercises discretion to exact less
than the full measure of punishment from someone who has no legal
means of resisting the severity of the sentence or the denial of relief.
If retributivism is accepted, then clemency as here defined, clemencyas-lenity, is never justified. Retributivists repudiate the ordinary
meaning of clemency in favor of clemency-as-remedial-retributivejustice.
"Mercy" characterizes any act or judgment, private or official,
whether an initial determination or remedial, where less is exacted
than is owed or deserved. Retributivists deny that it is compatible
with public justice for a judge or governor in his or her official
capacity to be merciful, to be lenient rather than impose the
retributively deserved sentence.7 Mercy, retributivists contend, can
6. Carla Ann Hage Johnson, Entitled to Clemency: Mercy in the Criminal Law, 10 L. &
PHIL. 109 (1991), has made this conceptual point with special clarity.
7. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 188-92; see also Jeffrie Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice,
in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 162, 162 (1994).
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only be shown by someone who has himself been wronged, or to
whom a debt is owed in his private capacity. If such an individual
chooses to fully or partly release his wrongdoer or debtor out of
compassion, that act is merciful and virtuous. Retributivists need not
deny the value of compassion (although some retributivists defend
the value of retributive hatred), but they do deny that compassion has
any legitimate role in criminal sentencing. The justly punished have
not merely injured any immediate victim but have transgressed the
criminal law, thereby offending the state (if not a more fundamental
moral authority, whether divine, cosmic, or communal). Public actors
can neither forgive on behalf of the immediate victim nor absolve the
offender from his debt of retribution to the state.8 As we shall see,
compassion on the part of public actors as grounds for lenity is not
alien to the redemptive perspective.
The term "forgiveness," while sometimes used as a synonym for
"mercy" or "clemency," is usefully distinguished: "forgiveness" may
describe an attitude, a lack of resentment or a willingness to cease
resentment, towards someone who has done one an injury.
Forgiveness, like mercy, is the province of the person injured. Only
the person who has been injured or wronged has standing to forgive.9
Others may relinquish resentment-in-solidarity with the victim, but
they cannot provide the particular absolution of forgiveness that the
victim may give. A judge or governor, then, lacks standing to forgive
a criminal for the crime committed, while the person against whom
the crime has been committed has such standing. Retributivists point
out that forgiveness is compatible with the exaction of full restitution
or punishment. One can cease to resent, and even wish one's injurer
well, without offering mercy or advocating clemency; one can
welcome or insist that just punishment or restitution be exacted and
yet forgive.
Some retributivists endorse cultivating forgiveness while others
insist on the value of retributive resentment. 10 Alien to the spirit of
retributivism but not that of redemption is the notion that we are
obliged to forgive those who transgress against us, at least those who
8. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 184; Murphy, supra note 7.
9. See MOORE, supra note 3.
10. For retributivist proponents of the virtue of forgiveness, see MOORE, supra note 3, at
187, and Jean Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY,
supra note 7, at 35. For the defense of retributive hatred, see Jeffrie Murphy, Hatred: A
Qualified Defense, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, supra note 7, at 88, 88, and Robert Solomon,
Justice v. Vengeance, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 123 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
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are contrite, and do penance or make restitution. While some find it
morally objectionable or psychologically impossible to quell hatred of
one who has injured them, both the Jewish and Christian religions
From the redemptive
teach that it is possible and salutary.
perspective, unyielding hatred of the repentant transgressor is an
obstacle to fulfilling the purposes of criminal justice.
I will defend the legitimacy of redemptive clemency against the
neo-retributive program of eliminating all grounds of clemency-save
rectification of excessive sentences and actual innocence or uncertain
guilt. In so doing, I am aligning myself with practices which neoretributivists deem archaic survivals of a time when monarchs wielded
clemency for any purpose or on a whim. For retributivists there is
little to choose between the sale of pardons and yielding to
compassion for a prisoner suffering just punishment. I will also
defend the discretionary character of clemency against the call for
bureaucratization.
My concern in this Article is with a particular kind of clemency
or legal mercy, commutation, or reduction of sentence -whether the
reduction of a term of years, the reduction of a life sentence to a term
of years, the removal of ineligibility for parole affixed to a life
sentence, or commutation of capital punishment to a term of yearsby operation of the power of the executive, state or federal, to grant
such relief. Commutation is not the only form of clemency that
executives can provide. Such relief spans a gamut from pardon for
offenses that may have been committed but have never been
prosecuted, to restoration of rights after the penal sentence has been
completed. A pardon may be conditional or unconditional, and may
affect a whole class of persons (an amnesty). The clemency power
also encompasses reprieve, which postpones the execution of
sentence and remission of fines and forfeits."
The president enjoys all these powers of clemency in federal
cases, limited only by a bar against clemency in cases of
impeachment.12 The majority of governors have clemency powers as
broad as those of the president and enjoy the same comprehensive
discretion in cases in their respective states.13 The states exhibit a
11. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 4-6; Dome & Gewerth, supra note 4, at 439; Kobil, supra
note 3, at 8-21.
12. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
13. A majority of states exclude only cases of treason and impeachment from executive
clemency, while five states exclude other types of offenses from the reach of executive
clemency. See Dome & Gewerth, supra note 4, at 433.
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variety of clemency structures, but the majority of states vest the
governor with sole authority, or final authority subject to the
nonbinding recommendations of a clemency board. 4 Because the
governor is the decisive voice in a large majority of states, despite
variations in specific formats, I refer below to the clemency power in
the states as a power of governors, although the generalization masks
some varieties of form and practice among the states. I am concerned
here with commutation because it is this dimension of clemency that
has the greatest actual and potential impact on what might be called
"ordinary criminal justice," as opposed to uses of clemency for
reasons of state and of policy. These later uses are exemplified by
President Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon or President Carter's
amnesty of those who fled the United States rather than serve in the
armed forces during the Vietnam War.
Before examining the neo-retributive theory of clemency, it may
be helpful to present at least a brief sketch of the practice of
clemency, currently and during the course of the twentieth century.
The retributive and redemptive views of clemency have competed
throughout the century. Governors, citizens, and philosophers
throughout the century have been found in both camps. During the
last quarter of a century, the period in which retributivism has
dominated criminal justice policy in the United States, the institution
of clemency has atrophied. Despite sharp disagreement as to what
would constitute appropriate or principled use of the clemency
power, both retributive and redemptive theorists advocate greater use
of clemency than is currently employed.
Despite a few well-publicized exceptions, most state executives
and the national executive are cautious compared with their
predecessors earlier in the century in making use of the clemency
power. Moreover, it appears that this caution is correlated with a
shift in the last quarter of the twentieth century from the
predominance of redemptive rhetoric and justifications for the use of
the power to the rhetorical predominance of retributivism. Some of
the greater reluctance to use of the power can be attributed to
recognition of the improved position of criminal defendants to
protect their rights in the courts, due to such reforms as the right of
indigents to counsel and the enhanced ability to seek review of
14. States have a variety of procedures for the appointment or electing of clemency boards,
typically vesting the power to appoint in the governor; five states vest the clemency power in a
board rather than the governor, while some states allow clemency only with the approval of
both the board and governor. See id. at 427-29.
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sentences in appellate courts. These reforms do not alter the bleak
prospects for sentencing relief under the current criminal justice
dispensation nor fully account for the timorous executive.
From the beginning of the century through the 1960s, a
redemptive rhetoric of claiming responsibility for the final decision to
execute or commute, to confine or release, came naturally to
governors.15 The governor of today is more likely to portray himself
as bound to respect the decision of a jury, to respect the due process
of trial and appellate courts, and to heed obdurate victims. Here, for
example, is Governor Terry Sanford of North Carolina, claiming his
authority to exercise clemency under a redemptive justification:
The courts of our state and nation exercise in the name of the
people the powers of administration of justice. The Executive is
charged with the exercise in the name of the people of an equally
important attitude of a healthy society-that of mercy beyond the
strict framework of the law.
The use of executive clemency is not a criticism of the courts,
either express or implied. I have no criticism of any court or any
judge. Executive clemency does not involve the changing of any
judicial determination. It does not eliminate punishment; it does
consider rehabilitation.
To decide when and where such mercy should be extended is a
decision which must be made by the Executive. It cannot be
delegated even in part to anyone else, and thus the decision is a
lonely one.
It falls to the Governor to blend mercy with justice, as best he
can, involving human as well as legal considerations, in the light of
all circumstances after the passage of time, but before justice is
allowed to overrun mercy in the name of the power of the state.
I fully realize that reasonable men hold strong feelings on both
sides of every case where executive clemency is indicated. I
accepted the responsibility of being Governor, however, and I will
not shy away from1 6the responsibility of exercising the power of
executive clemency.

Here is Governor George W. Bush of Texas disclaiming a role
for himself as governor in capital cases except in cases of actual
innocence and employing the retributivist rhetoric:
I believe decisions about the death penalty are primarily the
responsibility of the judicial branch.... The executive branch is
15. For a discussion of clemency in the early twentieth century, see SUSAN DUFFEY
CAMPBELL, EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY IN NORTH CAROLINA (1984); Barnett, supra note 1.
16. TERRY SANFORD, On Executive Clemency, in MESSAGES, ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC

PAPERS OF GOVERNOR TERRY SANFORD 1961-1965, at 552, 552 (Memory F. Mitchell ed.,
1966).
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much more limited. I view it as a failsafe, one last review to make
sure that there is no doubt the individual is guilty and that he or she
has had the due process granted by our Constitution and laws and I

don't believe my role is to replace the verdict of the jury.... 17
The diminishing frequency of clemency in the neo-retributive era
has been well documented in the arena of capital punishment and at
the federal level. 18 Capital clemency today is a rare event, while
earlier in the century clemency was as common as execution in the
practice of many governors and many states. 19 The percentage of
federal clemency applications granted has declined steadily and
steeply from the Kennedy administration to the Clinton
administration, falling from 40.9% to 3.4%.20

President Kennedy

used his clemency power to release more than a hundred drug
offenders serving long mandatory sentences. 21 President Clinton had
released only three federal prisoners prior to his freeing of the eleven
Puerto Rican nationalists in the fall of 1999.22
Changing practices in the states are not well documented,
although it is clear that there remains a good deal of variation in
practice from state to state and from administration to
administration.23 Several states including Ohio and Florida have
instituted comprehensive reviews and releases for women prisoners
who killed batterers but were unable to offer battering defenses
under the law of their states at the time of trial.24 Occasionally, a
governor garners national attention by vigorously exercising his
17. GEORGE W. BUSH, A CHARGE TO KEEP 148 (1999). There certainly were governors
who took this conservative position earlier in the century. For example, Governor Pierce of
Oregon stated in 1924 that it is not his function to usurp the role of the judge and jury and that
trial decisions will stand "unless there is unusual showing of irregularity or error in the trial."
Barnett, supra note 1, at 500 (quoting Governor Pierce of Oregon). It would appear, though,
that Governor Bush has a lot more company today among fellow governors than did Governor
Barnett earlier in the century.
18. See Kobil, supra note 3, app. at 640; see also MOORE, supra note 3.
19. See Michael L. Radelet & Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman
Capital Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 289, 290 (1993); Elkan Abramowitz & David Paget, Note,
Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 136 (1964).
20. According to Justice Department statistics regarding the percentage of federal
clemency applications granted, Kennedy granted 40.9%, Ford 31.2%, Carter 21.6%, Reagan,
12.6%, Bush, 4.2%, and Clinton 3.4%. See Stuart Taylor, All the President'sPardons: The Real
Scandal, NAT'L J., Oct. 30, 1999, at 316, 316.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASS'N, supra note 4.
24. See Linda L. Ammons, Discretionary Justice: A Legal and Policy Analysis of a
Governor's Use of the Clemency Power in the Cases of Incarcerated Battered Women, 3 J.L. &
POL'Y 1, 3-4 (1994); see also Bill Thompson, Chiles-Backed Program Loses Financial Support,
TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 17, 1999, at 6 (reporting that, at the time Florida enacted its program,
Maryland, Ohio, and Texas had approved or were establishing such programs).
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clemency powers. Governor Toney Anaya of New Mexico cleared

2
his state's death row out of religious opposition to the death penalty.
Governor Celeste of Ohio has been exceptionally willing to use his
clemency power, not only on behalf of battered women, but also in

capital cases, and in cases where there is evidence of racial disparity
in sentences. 26 Few contemporary governors possess such appetites.

Consider the recent history in New York, where it was the practice of
Governor Lehman in the 1930s to commute the death sentence
whenever a judge on the Court of Appeals issued a dissent in a capital
case in which the death penalty was upheld. 27 Despite a prison
population swollen by the introduction in 1973 of the so-called

Rockefeller drug laws, which mandate a minimum of fifteen years for
minor possessory offenses, Governor Pataki granted only seventeen
early releases during his five years in office thus far, while his
predecessor Mario Cuomo released thirty-five persons in his twelve
28
years as governor.
As we shall see, while both neo-retributivists

and

those

advocating redemptive clemency regret the atrophy of clemency, their
diagnosis of the causes of the condition differ. Neo-retributivists look
to the reform of clemency, the last bastion of discretion in criminal
punishment, to reinvigorate the institution. From the redemptive
perspective, the grip of retribution on the American
imagination is the principle cause of the decline of clemency.
I.

social

CLEMENCY IN A RETRIBUTIVIST CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

A.

The Reemergence of Retribution

In 1970, every American state, as well as the federal system, had

an indeterminate sentencing scheme in which judges had wide initial
25. In 1986, Governor Toney Anaya commuted the sentences of all five men on New
Mexico's death row. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., FactsAbout Clemency (visited May 25, 2000)
<http://www.essential.org/dpic/clemency.html>; see also Toney Anaya, Statement by Toney
Anaya on CapitalPunishment, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 177 (1993).
26. See Kobil, supra note 3, at 629.
27. See Henry Weinstein, Issue of Clemency Is Davis' Most Difficult as Governor; Death
Row: He Must Choose Whether to Spare an Inmate Set to Die on Tuesday. Such Requests Are
Now Rarely Granted,L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6,1999, at Al.
28. See Richard Perez-Pena, 4 First-Time Drug Offenders Granted Clemency by Pataki,
N.Y. TIMES, LATE ED., Dec. 24, 1999, at B4. In the same article, the N.Y Times reports that
"[New York] state's prisons now hold 72,000 inmates, up from 12,000 in 1973. As recently as
1980, 11 percent of the people sent to state prisons were drug offenders, now they are just under
half the total." Id.
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sentencing discretion and in which parole boards would decide,
usually after a prisoner served a third of his sentence, whether and
when to release. 29 Twenty-five years later, all states had enacted
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions which require, for some
offenses, decades-long prison terms that in some states include
mandatory life without the possibility of parole as part of their
sentencing schemes.30 Fifteen states and the federal government have
also introduced guideline sentencing that requires judges to sentence
within relatively narrow ranges. At least forty states eliminated or
severely restricted parole to insure that prisoners, or certain classes of
prisoners, serve a large proportion of their sentences -typically
eighty-five percent.3 These trends are likely to intensify in response
to Congress's authorization in 1994 of billions of dollars in incentive
grants for states that adopt such anti-discretion measures as guideline
32
sentencing and parole abolition.
The rehabilitative approach, which had been preeminent from
early in the century, was rapidly overtaken by the retributive revival
of the 1970s.33 Judicial and parole discretion were the hallmark
policies of the rehabilitation era, which saw treatment tailored to the
individual offender as the most efficient crime control strategy and
the humane alternative to the imposition of retributive punishment.
The philosophy was well expressed at mid-century by Justice Black,
writing for the United States Supreme Court in Williams v. New
York-an opinion which perhaps ironically upheld the discretion of a
sentencing judge to impose a death penalty over a jury
recommendation for life imprisonment. Justice Black wrote:
New York statutes emphasize a prevalent modern philosophy of
penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not
merely the crime .... The belief no longer prevails that every
offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment
without regard to the past life and habits of a particular
offender.... Indeterminate sentences, the ultimate termination of
which are sometimes decided by non judicial agencies have to a
large extent taken the place of the old rigidly fixed punishments.
The practice of probation which relies heavily on non judicial
implementation has been accepted as a wise policy.... Retribution
29. See MICHEAL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 6 (1996).
30. See id. at 7.
31. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN SENTENCING
1(1999).
32. See id.; TONRY, supra note 29, at 6.
33. See TONRY, supra note 29, at 6-7; FRANCIS A. ALLEN, DECLINE OF THE
REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981).
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is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law.
Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become
important goals of criminal jurisprudence....
... [I]ndeterminate sentences and probation have resulted in
an increase in the discretionary powers exercised in fixing
punishments. In general, these modern changes have not resulted
in making the lot of offenders harder. On the contrary a strong
motivating force for the changes has been the belief that by careful
study of the lives and personalities of convicted offenders many
could be less severely punished and restored sooner to complete
freedom and 3useful
citizenship. This belief to a large extent has
4
been justified.

At century's end, the rehabilitation model of criminal justice has
collapsed under the weight of public responses to escalating crime
rates and incisive neo-retributive criticism." The critique was first
mounted in the late 1960s, popularized and distorted by anticrime
political rhetoric in the 1970s and 1980s, and remains ascendant.
Retributivism denotes a family of philosophies, versions of which
were embraced by Greek and Roman thinkers as well as by the
Jewish and Christian traditions. It is sufficient for my purposes
merely to locate contemporary neo-retributivism as a mansion in the
house of retributivism. The root idea or metaphor of retributivism is
that transgression creates an imbalance that must be restored by the
like suffering or privation of the wrongdoer. The idea was found in
cosmological form in the pre-Socratics, and was fundamental in
classical Greek and stoic ethics.3 6 The role of retribution, divine and
civil, in Jewish and Christian traditions is undeniable, although
crosscut and permeated with the redemptive themes of the
imperfection and unity of human nature in all subjects and rolestransgressor and victim, offender and judge. Jews and Christians are
exhorted to cultivate humility, forgiveness, and compassion. The
Jewish tradition places great emphasis on atonement and the primacy
of recognizing and addressing one's own failings, while the Christian
tradition emphasizes God-emulating, unconditional love. 37 Kant, the
modern philosopher most relied upon by contemporary neoretributivists, understood retributive punishment as a stringent

34. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,247-49 (1949).
35. While it is true that "tough-on-crime" policies proceeded unabated through a decade of
falling crime rates in the 1990s, crime rates remain high when measured against the benchmark
of mid-century rates.
36. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83, 86 (1993).
37. See David A. Hoekema, Punishment, the Criminal Law and Christian Social Ethics,
CRIM. JUST. ETHics Summer/Fall 1986, at 31,33 (1986).
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obligation, famously pronouncing that a doomed community was

obliged to execute the last murderer in prison before itself suffering
extinction.3 8 Hegel insisted that punishment was both a right of the
39
criminal and a duty of the state.
Contemporary neo-retributivism is likewise a family of views. It
has a father in Andrew von Hirsch, whose influential book Doing

Justice gained a wide audience for neo-retributive criminal justice
philosophy. 40 The following account of neo-retributivism relies on
von Hirsch's work.
Part of the success of neo-retributivism lies in the fact that while
the view appealed to conservatives, the neo-retributivist critique of

rehabilitation shared considerable common ground with liberal
critiques. Rehabilitation was discredited by social scientific criticism

41
regarding its failure to lower crime rates or prevent recidivism.
Even worse, from the liberal point of view, indeterminate sentencing
outcomes evinced racial and class biases.42 Rehabilitation was a

failure in its own terms, in that it did not cure and was subject to the
most damning social critique, that of systematically discriminating
against minority defendants.
Three core principles animate von Hirsch's work. I present them
below in an effort to understand what neo-retributivists mean by the
slogan "just desert," or as von Hirsch prefers, "commensurate
desert.

43

1. Logical or Semantic Principle
Only persons adjudicated guilty by courts, operating in
accordance with due process, under the authority of legitimate
governments, can be punished. While other forms of suffering and
38. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 102 (1965).
39. GEORG HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 100-01 (1952).
40. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 47 (1976).
The work was commissioned by two liberal foundations and was, like the influential AMERICAN
FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA (1971), highly critical of the rehabilitation model. The only other proponent of neoretributivism whose views are apparently as universally cited as von Hirsch is Herbert Morris,
whose social contractarian justification of retributivism is widely accepted by retributivist
theorists, including von Hirsch, who is quite catholic in his approach to the support of
retributivism. See Herbert Morris, Personsand Punishment,52 MONIST 475 (1968).
41. See TONRY, supra note 29.
42. See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 40, at 172, which was an important
document charging race and class discrimination in rehabilitation era sentencing.
43. The mansion of contemporary neo-retributivism contains much that I will not explore,
including the exploration of the retributive emotions and their significance for moral and social
theory. See FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, supra note 7; Solomon, supra note 10.
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privation can be inflicted on persons deserving and undeserving of
punishment by agents of the state and others, such suffering and
privationcannot be punishment.
The logical thesis is the fruit of several generations of criticism of
utilitarian philosophy and is now widely accepted by utilitarians and
nonutilitarians alike. Almost all utilitarians regard satisfying this
principle as a requisite for any adequate theory of punishment." The
seminal mid-century rendition of this position was that of John
Rawls. 41 Rawls argued that while utilitarianism might justify the
practice of punishment, adjudicated guilt was a requirement for
punishment within the institution of criminal justice; thus it was a
"practice rule" that nothing could count as punishment absent such
adjudication. From this semantic vantage point, retributivists argue
that it is absurd, as well as frightening, to attempt to justify
punishment as rehabilitative treatment:46 The cachement of persons
who could be improved by treatment-assuming that the science and
art of such treatment exists- is indefinitely large, and probably coextensive with the population under the jurisdiction of their potential
benefactors.
2.

Deontological or Justificatory Principle

The commission of crime justifies the infliction of punishment.
Crime deserves punishment.
The root idea here again is anti-utilitarian. The justification of
punishment is "retrospective. '' 7 Punishment redresses the imbalance
and restores equilibrium created by the past wrong.48 Social utility
could never alone justify the pain and opprobrium of punishment.
Retributivists differ as to whether crime is a sufficient justification of
Unlike some
punishment or merely a necessary condition.
retributivists, von Hirsch does not follow Kant and Hegel in arguing
Overcoming
that the fact of crime requires punishment.
humanitarian objections to the deliberate infliction of suffering
49
requires that punishment be further justified by its deterrent value.
44. See RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY: THE PROBLEMS OF NORMATIVE AND
CRITICAL ETHICS (1959).

45. See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules (1955), reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
PUNISHMENT (H. B. Acton ed., 1969). The thesis was first developed as a criticism of
utilitarianism by the early twentieth century British intuitionists.
46. See Morris, supra note 40.
47. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 40.
48. See id. at 4748.
49. See id. at 55.
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Principle of Just Deserts

The measure of punishment is the seriousness of the offense and
the culpability of the offender.
Seriousness, for von Hirsch, has two components: (1) the
seriousness of the harm done or risked; and (2) the degree of
culpability, as understood by reference to traditional criminal law
analysis -importantly mens rea categories and including a prior
criminal record. 0 The neo-retributivist is thus able to co-opt the
rehabilitation era's norm that the offender's punishment ought to be
individualized rather than subjecting all offenders of a certain kind to
the same penalty. Punishments should be tailored; however, the just
measure is not progress in treatment but the gravity of the offense
and the extent of culpability. The insistence that there are two
dimensions of offense seriousness, the gravity of harm and the moral
culpability of the offender, modernizes retributive ideas and aligns
them with contemporary thinking about the salience of gradations of
culpability in criminal law. I use the term "neo-retributivism" to
mark this successful adaptation of the retributivist philosophy.
The most devastating neo-retributive critique of rehabilitation
criminal justice was aimed at the lack of horizontal and vertical equity
in the sentencing outcomes it produced.
Offenders who had
committed offenses of similar gravity and were similarly culpable
could be subject to incarceration or not, and, if incarcerated, serve
sentences of widely varying length. Offenders who had committed
trivial offenses might be incarcerated for much longer periods of time
than those whose offenses were grave. Excessive discretion on the
part of judges and parole boards, and the curative goal, had allowed
the criminal justice system to become fundamentally unjust. Just or
commensurate deserts would both calibrate penalties fairly and
eliminate what von Hirsch called "class justice:"51
[T]he middle-class person is put on probation and the ghetto youth
jailed for the same infraction, on the theory that the former's
sensitivities are greater. More drastic measures thus come to be
imposed chiefly on those of lower status who are deemed to have
"less to lose"-but only because they5 have lost so much already
through their deprived social situation.
Retributivists, who like von Hirsch advocate that each offender

50. See id. at 79.
51. Id. at 90.
52. Id.
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be punished no more but no less than he or she deserves, must
confront the apparently insuperable problem of determining what
punishment each offense deserves. Some crimes, like rape, defy any
civilized retributivist to call for a like punishment. The project of
calculating the price of crime, the equivalent in months or years of
incarceration, is daunting if not delusional. 53 Von Hirsch met the
challenge of the implausibility of determining punishment in absolute
terms with the notion of proportionate punishments.
Von Hirsch argued that commensurate or just deserts should be
understood as demanding proportionate punishment. All severe
crimes should be punished severely. No trivial offenses should be
punished severely. More severe offenses should always be punished
more than less severe. These strictures could be satisfied by a
sentencing scheme that maintained an appropriate scale of relative
severity. As for the magnitudes of punishment, von Hirsch candidly
relied upon intuition to support the notions that incarceration was a
severe punishment to be reserved for serious crimes like the infliction
of serious bodily damage, and that no petty crimes, like minor thefts,
should not be punished as serious crimes. He believed that both
research and common sense supported the notion that a scheme of
perhaps five or six offense levels could be devised into which offenses
could be sorted. There was no need to develop a metaphysics of
equivalent suffering, or to resort to the kind of pseudoscience of
elaborate distinctions expressed in the federal sentencing guidelines
that went into effect in 1987.14 In other respects the scheme he
envisioned was like guideline sentencing, envisioning a range of
penalties attached to each offense level, and variations within the
range for a given offense at any level to depend on culpability factors.
Von Hirsch advocated what are today called "truth in
sentencing" measures of curtailed judicial discretion and abolition of
parole, but he opposed draconian sentencing. He favored a penology
of least confinement and least restrictive conditions of confinement
on humanitarian grounds. He imagined that five or ten years would
be the likely top of the range for an incarcerative penalty in a
retributively just scheme for all offenses except the most aggravated
55
murders.
53. See Mary Ellen Gale, Retribution Punishment and Death, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 973,
1004-05, for a critique of this aspect of the retributivist program. See generally Jean Hampton,
The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, supra note 7, at 111.
54. See TONRY, supra note 29, at 72-99.
55. VON HIRSCH, supra note 40, at 93, 107-23.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1501

Much of the neo-retributivist program of reform has been
adopted since the publication of Doing Justice in 1976. The results
have sharply deviated from those advocated by von Hirsch in the
enthusiastic recourse to incarceration and in the draconian length of
sentences. 6 After a quarter century of retributivist reform, the
magnitude of the incarcerated population and the length of sentences
they are serving render clemency a critical issue for retributivists and
nonretributivists alike.
B.

The Neo-Retributivist Theory of Clemency

Kathleen Dean Moore has taken the lead in developing a neoretributivist theory of clemency.57 Building on her work in moral
philosophy, Richard Kobil has argued for a reformed clemency
system in which prisoners are entitled to clemency review in
accordance with fair procedures and explicit retributively-justified
standards for release. 8 Both neo-retributivist authors argue that
much more frequent use of the clemency power than is now made by
executives is justified within a retributive system.
Moore offers a plausible diagnosis of the hesitancy of
contemporary executives to use their clemency powers. She sees it as
an archaic institution which ill comports with modern notions of
sovereignty. The notion of clemency as a free gift from a sovereign,
an expression of his puissance and benevolence requiring no other
justification, ill suits a governor or president in a democratic republic.
Moore is grudgingly tolerant of the discretionary use of clemency for
reasons of state or policy at the federal level for such hallowed
purposes as healing divisions after war or rebellion. Political uses of
the clemency power were clearly envisioned by the constitutional
founders; these uses are marginal to her concern with ordinary
criminal justice. The clemency power has fallen into disuse and
forfeited public acceptance because it has not been brought into line
with contemporary criminal justice norms: These demand due process
rather than wide discretion and the application of neo-retibutivists
substantive norms. 59
56. North Carolina's recent sentencing reforms track von Hirsch's policy notions, at least
with respect to nonviolent crimes and first time offenders, and may be a bellwether of a countertrend away from heavy use of incarcerative penalties. See generally NORTH CAROLINA
SENTENCING AND POLICY COMM'N, STRucruRED SENTENCING FOR FELONIES (1998).

57. MOORE, supra note 3.
58. Kobil, supra note 3, at 611-38.
59. See MOORE, supra note 3.
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This account has plausibility. It appears that modern executives
are inhibited in the use of clemency. With the exception of a spate of
clemencies for battered women who killed their tormentors, there
have been few well-publicized uses of the clemency power. The use
of clemency in capital cases, perhaps as good an index as any of
executive willingness to use clemency, has fallen off dramatically. 6° If
public support for clemency has fallen away, it is not because this
power has historically been greatly abused. Clemency in the United
States has been largely, although not entirely, untainted by scandal.
In 1920, Governor J. C. Walton of Oklahoma, who did a brisk
business in the sale of pardons, became the only American governor
impeached and removed from office for abusing the clemency
power. 61 While never impeached, Governor Blanton of Tennessee
was also implicated in a pardon selling scandal. 62 Despite such
blemishes, the explanation for the reticence of the contemporary
executive is not a tarnished past.
I cannot agree that proponents of greater use of clemency should
pin their hopes on the coming of a day when retributivism disciplines
and rationalizes the use of clemency. There is no doubt that a very
considerable scope for expansion exists for the use of the clemency
power on retributivist grounds and for insight in the expectation that
the public could support such grants of clemency. But governors have
other cultural resources to draw upon in the storehouse of traditional
nonretributivist justifications for clemency to gain acceptance for
greater use of the power. Governors may have to sense the receding
of the retributivist tide before they are willing to grant more
clemency.
The neo-retributivist embraces all grants of clemency that are
justified by just deserts and repudiates all others. The neoretributivist further advocates assimilating clemency to judicial
proceedings governed by due process norms and substantive norms of
entitlement.
1.

Clemency Principle

Executive clemency is justified if and only if employed to reduce a
sentence, which is incommensuratewith just deserts.
60. See Radelet & Zsembik, supra note 19; Abramowitz & Paget, supra note 19.
61. See MOORE, suprit note 3, at 202-03.
62. Several members of his administration pled guilty to federal charges in the 1980s. See
PETER MAAS, MARIE: A TRUE STORY 415 (1983); Kobil, supra note 3, at 607.
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Juridizication Principle

Proceduresand substantive norms which express the grounds for
relief ought to be developed; where clemency is warrantedon grounds
of justice, the executive ought to grant it.

The position taken by Moore is that clemency as heretofore
practiced has issued, if we put aside the properly political uses of
clemency, either remedial retributive justice or injustice. The former
is not lenity at all but strict justice. All lenity in the sense in which I
have defined clemency, discretionary lenity, is a derogation from
justice.63 Clemency is either remedial justice or it is unjustified and
ought not to be granted.
The retributive argument against clemency-as-lenity has been
put forward with great force by Jeffrie Murphy. 64 Murphy has argued
that legal mercy is not "an autonomous virtue." Either the relief
sought is deserved, in which case the recipient demands a right, or the
grantor lapses, deviating from strict justice. Murphy is addressing
discretionary lenity on the part of judges, parole boards, and
prosecutors; but his account of mercy could equally be addressed to
governors and presidents. Mercy is either a requirement of justice or
a deviation from justice. There thus simply is no room for mercy as
an autonomous virtue with which their justice should be tempered.
Let them keep their sentimentality to themselves for use in their
private lives with their families and pets. 5
This is a harsh view and certainly it is asserted in a harsh idiom.
But it is nonetheless the view adopted by Moore and Kobil. It is in
fact required by the Deontological Principle. Just punishment is
determined retrospectively. All information relevant to just desert is
at least in principle available at the time of sentencing. While errors
that were not avoided at the time of sentencing ought later to be
corrected, nothing the offender does after sentencing is relevant to a
clemency decision. The measure of just punishment remains for any
authority reviewing a sentence-just deserts, the criminal harm
caused or risked, and the culpability of the offender. The Clemency
Principle confirms the retributivist commitment to a single dimension
to measure the appropriate dose of punishment-commensurability
63. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 192.
64. See generally FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, supra note 7; Jeffrie Murphy, Mercy and
Legal Justice, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, supra note 7, at 162; Alwynne Smart, Mercy, in
THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 212 (H. B. Anton ed., 1969); Claudia Card, Mercy, 81 PHIL.
REV. 182 (1972); Nussbaum, supra note 36.
65. See Murphy, supra note 64, at 174.
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with the severity of offense: There are no other considerations of
justice when initial sentence is pronounced nor at any time thereafter.
The neo-retributivist reduces clemency to a type of remedial
justice. Persons unjustly convicted or persons whose punishments
exceed their just deserts are fit objects of clemency-but no others.
But clemency as it has heretofore been practiced differs from other
institutional methods of rectifying miscarriages of justice in one
important respect: under current clemency regimes, the petitioner is
asking for something to which he or she has no legally recognized
right, but rather lies in the discretion of the clemency authority. If
neo-retributivist reforms were adopted, clemency proceedings would
become more like judicial courts of last resort. A petition will not ask
for a discretionary boon, but seek to vindicate a right. As with any
court of last resort, if the petition is denied there would be no further
recourse however just the cause.
II. EASY AND HARD CASES FOR A NEO-RETRIBUTIVE THEORY OF
CLEMENCY

There is substantial common ground between neo-retributivists
and the more expansive redemptive view of clemency; both camps
acknowledge the legitimacy of remission of punishment on grounds of
actual innocence or uncertain guilt, or excessive punishment
measured against retributive standards. These are easy cases to
justify, although it may take considerable political fortitude on the
part of a governor to grant release. The hard cases for the
retributivist are those in which the grounds for clemency lie in
postconviction transformations or contributions. These cases are
hard because the retributivist must advocate against appealing
instances of rehabilitation and heroism, which have long histories of
moving clemency authorities.
A.
1.

Easy Cases

Innocence or Uncertain Guilt

Cases where actual innocence can be conclusively established, or
where there are doubts about guilt, have always been thought to
merit clemency, which offers an expedient method of redress. 66
66. See Radelet & Zsembik, supra note 19, at 290-92, which identifies expediency as the
basis for capital clemency in the majority of the 70 post-Furman capital cases (i.e., clemency to
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A case which illustrates willingness to grant clemency in the face
of doubts about guilt is North Carolina Governor Jim Martin's
commutation of the death sentence of Anson Maynard Avery in
1991.67 Avery was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to
die for the 1981 murder of Stephen Henry. The state's theory was
that Avery feared Henry would be a witness in a prosecution against
him for leading a larceny ring. 68 Governor Martin commuted Avery's
death sentence upon being presented with evidence that Avery may
well have helped to dispose of the body under duress but may not
have participated in the murder. The murder may have been
committed by a supposed accomplice of Avery's who made a deal for
69
immunity with prosecutors-a deal tainted with corruption.
Clemency on grounds of actual innocence or uncertain guilt is
immediately justified on retributivist grounds; innocence is an easy
case on any theory of clemency.
2.

Infirmity/Mitigation of Culpability

Under this rubric would come relief for prisoners whose
sentences reflected an unjust severity relative to their moral
culpability. The largest class of such cases results from the failure of
the law to adequately calibrate criminal responsibility where an
offender is mentally ill or mentally retarded.
In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Supreme Court held that the mentally
retarded were not categorically exempt from capital punishment on
Eighth Amendment grounds, that such punishment would be cruel or
unusual. 70 It would clearly not offend neo-retributivism, however, if
the governor of Texas commuted Michael Penry's sentence. Penry
was sentenced to die for a brutal rape-murder committed shortly after
his release on parole after conviction for another rape. Penry's case
for mitigation is that he had a mental age of 6 1/2 and an emotional
71
age of nine or ten, due in whole or in part to organic brain damage.
The use of clemency to express refinements in culpability
save the time and expense of likely judicial resentencing proceedings).
67. See North Carolina v. Maynard, 316 S.E.2d 197 (N.C. 1984).
68. See generally id.
69. Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., State of North Carolina Appellate Defender, who
represented Avery in his successful petition for clemency, recounted the case to the Fall 1999
Clemency Seminar at Duke Law School. This clemency is one of only two granted by North
Carolina governors in a capital case in the post-Furman era. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., supra
note 25.
70. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
71. See id. at 307-08.
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analysis in anticipation of legal reform is venerable.72 The neoretributive emphasis on sensitive and accurate culpability assessment
as a measure of punishment allows governors to justify commutation
in a case like Penry's on the grounds of retributive justice.
3.

Considerations of Horizontal or Vertical Equity

Clemency granted to an offender who has been sentenced more
severely than accomplices equally or more culpable of the same
offense, or than others under sentence for similar offenses, is easily
justifiable on neo-retributive grounds.
Such clemencies aim at
achieving horizontal sentencing equity, which is a critical goal for
retributive punishment.
Equally, vertical equity justifies on
retributive grounds giving relief to a whole class of offenders who are
overpunished relative to perpetrators of more severe offenses.
In 1999, Governor Pataki of New York reduced the sentences of
four prisoners serving long sentences under the so-called Rockefeller
drug laws, which mandate terms in excess of fifteen years for
possessory drug offenses.7 3 Prior to obtaining clemency, these
prisoners had already served more time for nonviolent possessory
offenses than New York has imposed for such violent offenses as rape
and homicide.74 These releases, and indeed a much more aggressive
approach to the release of nonviolent drug offenders, are easy to
justify on retributive grounds as a corrective, equitable adjustment.
4.

Einsteinian Cases: The Relativity of Time

Moore argues that imminent death, whether from illness or old
age, may merit clemency on retributivists grounds.75 It is a terribly
painful thing to die in prison and therefore add a quantum of
suffering above the norm anticipated by the sentencer (save for life
terms). If the quantum of suffering inflicted on a prisoner is enlarged
by the prospect of death in prison, or through an illness which greatly
enhances suffering when endured in prison conditions, then medical
clemency may be in order. To grant clemency in such circumstances
forestalls the injustice of overpunishment relative to desert, and the
disturbance of equity that would occur, if the sentence were allowed
72. Twelve out of 40 capital punishment states forbid execution of the mentally retarded.
See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., supra note 25; Sebba, supra note 3.
73. See Perez-Pena, supra note 28, at B4.
74. See id.
75. MOORE, supra note 3.
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to run its course.
Medical clemency is hardly unknown. Governor Mario Cuomo
of New York granted clemency to a dying AIDS patient after he had
failed to persuade the state legislature to adopt a comprehensive
program of medical parole. 76 Examples of governors offering
clemency to the infirm, the aged, and the dying are not rare, and some
77
states systematically practice medical clemency or medical parole.
Unlike the earlier types of cases considered, the acknowledgement of medical clemency has the potential to disrupt the
retributive account of clemency. That death in confinement enhances
suffering may be something that most people can understand and
agree upon, yet it is not categorically different from many other ways
in which the suffering of one prisoner may be significantly enhanced
beyond that of another by reason of temperament, mental and
physical condition, experience, and circumstances. For example, a
prisoner whose spouse is dying, or whose children are suffering for
want of support, or who is tormented by the cruelties of fellow
prisoners or guards, or who is fearful and anxious by nature, or who is
subject to intense remorse, or who is troubled by the fear of
damnation, may suffer more than other prisoners. Any of these
variations on the manner and intensity in which prisoners may suffer
may disturb horizontal and vertical equity. The sick and dying
prisoner has the special appeal of recognized common human
experience and the special authority of suffering that is hard to feign,
but is not otherwise distinctly or uniquely situated as one who suffers
above the norm.
Could it be that the retributive theory is in danger of dissolving
into a theory of compassion? For what is compassion if not sympathy
for the suffering of another compounded by the recognition that he is
like us in his suffering and we are like him in his vulnerability? If
clemency were justified in any degree in fellow feeling and the
impulse to put an end to suffering, then the retributivist theory of
clemency would be refuted, at least with respect to its reductionist
claim to provide the sole measure of just punishment.
Medical or compassionate clemencies may not comprise easy
cases for neo-retributivists after all: These cases undermine both the
notion of the univocal scale of measuring punishment, in months or
76. See Edward A. Adams, Cuomo Faces Annual Ritual of Deciding on Clemency, N.Y.
L.J., Dec. 28, 1992, at 3, 3.
77. See Barnett, supra note 1, at 518-19.
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years of confinement, and the moral and psychic distance between
prisoner and free citizen.
B.

Hard Cases

For the neo-retributivist there can be no cases of legitimate
clemency based on the postconviction achievements of prisoners.
Thus, neither rehabilitation nor service could earn a prisoner
clemency since no postconviction action can influence or diminish the
debt of suffering owed for crime. From the redemptive perspective it
is possible to describe post-conviction achievements as grounds for
clemency. Redemptive clemency may be deserved in the sense that it
is earned but not owed, merited by actions that create no
retributively-justified entitlement. There are at least two types of
cases that exemplify post-conviction merit, rehabilitation and heroic
service.
I will focus most attention on the former, because
rehabilitation cases are more common. However, heroic service
provides an important test of the adequacy of neo-retributive theory
because even one case of legitimate clemency on other than
retributive justice grounds would refute the reductivist claim that
clemency can never be based on post-conviction achievements.
1.

Heroism: the Doctor Who Fought the Epidemic in Prison

Moore recounts the story of Dr. Samuel Mudd, 78 who
unsuspectingly set the leg of a man he later learned was John Wilkes
Booth, while in flight after the assassination of President Lincoln. Dr.
Mudd was sentenced to life in prison for conspiring to assassinate the
president. Four years later, he distinguished himself by fighting a
yellow fever epidemic in prison. He was pardoned for his heroism;
the pardon was not based in any part on Mudd's innocence, the
injustices that had been heaped upon him, or the travesty of justice
that was his trial.
Moore argues, consistent with her neo-retributive position, that
while Dr. Mudd deserved a pardon of innocence, heroic service
rendered after conviction, like any other merit acquired after
conviction, is neither relevant to the justness of punishment nor a
ground for its recalibration. 79 Her analysis, although logically
impeccable, is dogmatic because it blocks examination of why a
78. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 197.
79. See id. at 204, 210.
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conspirator-doctor who performs heroic service may be said to have
earned consideration of early release. Such heroism may simply be a
display of prowess. But let us suppose a guilty Dr. Mudd who has
come to believe that assassination was unjustified, that he has made a
terrible mistake in judgment.
Let us suppose a Dr. Mudd, whose willingness to risk death is
borne of the desire to expiate the crime committed and of
recommitment to the humane mission of medicine. There would in
such a case be no further need to incapacitate the doctor. Several
features of the hypothetical Dr. Mudd's case may appear relevant to
granting some remission of punishment. These include: (1) Mudd's
moral transformation, his acknowledgement of his wrong, and his
desire to expiate through sacrifice; (2) the risk of his own life; and (3)
the recommitment to medicine, i.e., a choice for social altruism. I am
not suggesting that every right-thinking executive must release the
doctor in light of these features of his case. It would be morally
coherent to assign him to the prison hospital and allow him to pursue
his calling and expiation in prison. My quarrel with retributivism is
that it must treat these factors as irrelevant, as having no possible
weight or place in consideration of a clemency petition from Dr.
Mudd. The intuitive force of these features as weighing in favor of
clemency for the doctor is grounded in a redemptive conception of
criminal justice. Aspects of that perspective will be canvassed below,
although a full account of so large and varied a family of views is
beyond the scope of this Article.
2.

Rehabilitation: The Case of Precious Bedell

°

From time to time, inmates rehabilitate themselves in prison.
Such was the case with Precious Bedell, who was sentenced to twentyfive years to life for the second-degree murder of her toddler
daughter LaShonda in 1979.81
LaShonda had been fussy and
uncooperative during a dinner at Valle's Steakhouse in Syracuse.
Precious took the child to the restroom, struck her, and beat her while
the child was perched on a sink ledge. The child fell and her skull
80. In addition to the cases cited, my account of the Bedell case is based upon: Editorial,
Precious Bedell Amid Lingering Frustration,Freedomat Last, POST-STANDARD, Nov. 23, 1999,
at A12, Jennifer Gonnerman, Campaigning for Clemency, VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 22, 1998, at
40, and Jon R. Sorensen, Give Con Clemency, Says Celeb, DAILY NEWS, Dec. 30, 1999. Also,
my account is based upon interviews with Bedell's attorney, Nancy Hollender, in Albuquerque,
New Mexico, in Fall of 1998.
81. See People v. Bedell, 464 N.Y.S.2d 613 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
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shattered on the tile floor. Precious had not been habitually abusive
to LaShonda nor her two older children. Yet she deliberately struck
her small, vulnerable daughter in anger, and the child died.
Bedell went into prison at age twenty-six as a drug-abusing, petty
criminal with an abrasive, chip-on-the-shoulder personality. In prison
she became a different person. She took advantage of therapy
programs. She converted to Catholicism because of the welcome and
support of the Catholic community. She became a model prisoner.
She accepted responsibility for LaShonda's death and knew remorse.
She cultivated good relationships with her surviving children. She
educated herself, completing high school, acquiring a bachelor's and a
master's degree, and beginning work on her Ph.D. She devoted
herself to gaining an intellectual understanding of mothers at risk of
harming their children-her college and graduate school work-and
to developing programs in prison to help women avoid these perils
and be good parents-her work in prison. It has been her ambition
for some time to do the same kind of work on the outside as she has
done in prison.
Precious Bedell was denied clemency by Governor Cuomo, and
denied again by Governor Pataki in 1998. In 1999, Judge Fahey of
the County Court of Onondaga, New York, vacated her conviction,
based on irregularities at her trial. She pled guilty to second-degree
manslaughter, was sentenced to time served, and released in late
November of that year.82 Precious Bedell was given a heavy sentence
for the kind of crime she committed; she did not intend to inflict a
life-threatening injury on LaShonda. However, such severity is within
the normal range of outcomes in cases of this type. Whatever degree
of culpability, she had a case for clemency based on rehabilitation.
She was no longer the person who had been sentenced. Starting with
acceptance of responsibility for her daughter's death, she sought to
transform herself into someone who could spare other children and
82. See id. The case was vacated by order of Justice Fahey on November 16, 1999. The
People joined Bedell's motion to vacate. The District Attorney of Onondaga County, William
J. Fitzpatrick, strongly supported the failed clemency bid made by Bedell. Bedell had dedicated
and visible supporters, including her attorney Nancy Hollander, who fought for her release for
over a dozen years, and the actress Glenn Close, who met Bedell while working on a project at
Bedell Hills Prison.
The Village Voice ran an illuminating if disheartening article on the eve of Bedell's
second denial of clemency. See Gonnerman, supra note 80, at 2. From the article, we learn
something about the strain and competition each year among inmates with good clemency
prospects. See id. One inmate who was successful explained, "You have to separate yourself
from the others because there are so many people who are fully rehabilitated and ready to
reenter society. My art is how I separated myself from the crowd." Id.
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their mothers' from the very harm she herself had caused. She
designed, organized, and implemented such help for other women
while in prison. Her work at Bedford Hills Women's Prison has been
influential in establishing standards and guidelines for the
rehabilitation of incarcerated parents and for the improvement of
their children's lives in New York and across the country. She
progressed from a wiseacre to a morally serious and productive
person. Her spiritual progress in the twenty years she was
incarcerated exceeds mine, and likely exceeds yours, my reader, and
that of anyone who sat as judge, juror, or clemency authority in her
case. From a retributivist point of view, Precious' progress is
irrelevant to the issue of her clemency, and she was properly denied
clemency by both governors: If Judge Fahey was moved by anything
other than constitutional defects in her original trial, his action was
improper, clouded perhaps by sympathy, admiration, or humility that
ought not to have influenced his judgment.
3. Rehabilitation as a Grounds of Clemency in the Bedell Case
Could a governor justifiably have granted clemency to Precious
Bedell? Surely not on retributive grounds, unless her sentence was
excessive relative to her offense and her culpability. Justifiable
clemency for Bedell, then, would require the augmentation of the
objectives of criminal justice to include such goals as the
rehabilitation of offenders and their reconciliation with and
reintegration into society. It would also require treating the
retributively-justified sentence as an upper limit of punishment, the
completion of which might be overborne by other criminal justice
considerations. The willingness to diminish sentences below the
retributively just requirement is the sharpest point of disagreement
between retributive and redemptive perspectives.
The deliberate infliction of suffering on anyone, including the
deserving prisoner, troubles some retributivists, but not all. The
deliberate infliction of further suffering on the fully rehabilitated is
particularly difficult to justify. Von Hirsch believes that were it not
for the societal need for deterrence, the infliction of punishment,
although deserved, could not be fully justified. 83 However, many
retributivists are satisfied by the deontic answer that punishment
neither can have, nor needs, any justification other than the offense.
Some retributivists appeal to the satisfaction of the passions of hatred
83. VON HIRSCH, supra note 40, at 54-55.
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and vengeance on the part of victims and of society generally, and of
the catharsis and moral recommitment provided to both victims and
society in so doing.84
Ordinary victims and ordinary citizens, as well as philosophers,
sometimes find that they cannot or do not choose to forgive or
reconcile with those who have committed grave offenses. 85 Surely for
some the failure of the state to exact the full measure of retributive
punishment from an offender would render reconciliation more
difficult to attain. Yet victims of crimes sometimes want contrition
from perpetrators, recognition of their undeserved suffering and
acknowledgement of responsibility, as much or more than they want
to see punishment exacted. 86 There may be an unbridgeable gap of
moral judgment dividing those victims and citizens who demand the
full exaction of retributive justice, those who would prefer
reconciliation to retribution, and those who desire both full
retribution and reconciliation.8 7 The gap surely closes when we
imagine the psychological and moral response of victims to the
repentant rather than the gloating, the aggrieved, or the indifferent.
Both the Jewish and Christian religions repudiate unyielding hatred
and ostricism of a transgressor. Jews are obliged to forgive the
repentant transgressor who makes reparations, and Christians are

84. See FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, supra note 7; see also Jeffrie Murphy, Moral
Epistemology, the Retributive Emotions and the Clumsy Moral Philosophy of Jesus Christ, in
THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 10, at 149 (in which Murphy partly recants his earlier work);
Solomon, supra note 10.
85. See, e.g., Josh White, Supreme Court Stays Execution; Man Killed Va. Trooper in 1993,
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 2, 1999, at B1 (reporting that the victim's widow supported
execution, but his two adult children wrote to Governor Gilmore asking for clemency). Simon
Wiesenthaler recounts the improbable but true autobiographical story of a dying young soldier
summoning the author, a death camp inmate on work detail, to ask forgiveness for his murder of
other Jews. See SIMON WIESENTHALER, THE SUNFLOWER 7 (1998). A number of notables
contribute short essays to the volume on what they think they would have done in Simon's
place. See id. The entire volume is a powerful meditation on the ethics of forgiveness. See id.;
see also SISTER HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE
DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1993) (in which the author discusses her experiences
ministering to the survivors of murder victims and survivors who sought the death of the killer
sometimes hoped for surcease and closure that the execution failed to bring them).
86. See John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or
Utopian, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727 (1999). Braithwaite discusses this theme in indigenous Maori
and Native American restorative justice practices. See id. He writes that what "we learned
from indigenous practice was that material reparation was much less important than emotional
or symbolic reparation. Victims often wanted an apology more than compensation." Id. at 1728;
see also PREJEAN, supra note 85.
87. See Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints:
Reflections on Restorative Justice, in TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE (Robert Rotberg & Dennis
Thomson eds., 2000).
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exhorted to the harder task of loving the transgressor. 88 In addition to
the theological bases of the redemptive orientation of Jewish and
Christian thought, the orientation surely implies recognition of the
social and psychological costs that a purely retributive approach
imposes on victims and society.
It would be a mistake, a fallacy of sorts, to infer the adequacy of
retributivism as a criminal justice philosophy from the existence of
the retributive emotions or the authenticity of the retributive
judgments of some victims and citizens. The cultural material at
hand, from which we may fashion theories and practices of criminal
justice, comprehends not only retributive principles and impulses, but
also the possibility of redemption and the value of reconciliation.
After twenty-five years of retributivism, there may be renewed
openness to redemption in the United States. An argument has been
made, and acted upon, in South Africa and other nations torn by
89
internecine strife, that reconciliation is the more pragmatic strategy.
Perhaps a bridge between retributivist and redemptive views of
clemency lies in the redemptive notion that punishment can be, at
least for someone who rehabilitates like Precious Bedell, not merely
suffering endured, but also dynamic and transformative. 90 Few can
comprehend the quality and intensity of the suffering experienced by
Bedell in owning responsibility for the death of her child, the
privations of her surviving children, and her own imprisonment. It
may be that, like the suffering of the sick and the dying, redemptive
suffering takes the prisoner out of the norm for her class of offenders
and enhances or accelerates suffering.
One respect in which the redemptive perspective differs from
that of retribution is that punishment is seen as part of a dynamic
process, at least potentially, of transformation. While retributive
punishment may be justified regardless of whether transformation
takes place, the most desirable and complete outcome is redemption
and social reintegration. That outcome having been achieved, as in
the case of Precious Bedell, remitting further penal confinement does
88. See generally Hoekema, supra note 37; see also L. GREGORY JONES, EMBODYING
FORGIVENESS (1995).
89. In his contribution to THE SUNFLOWER, Desmond Tutu writes, "It is clear that if we
look only to retributive justice, we might as well close up shop. Forgiveness is not some
Without forgiveness, there is no future."
It is practical politics.
nebulous thing.
WIESENTHALER, supra note 85, at 268.
90. See Steven P. Garvey, Punishmentas Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801 (1999), for an
exploration of redemptive punishment drawing on religious sources rather than the dubious
science and paternalism of the older rehabilitation model.
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not frustrate any fundamental moral requirement.
A second respect in which the redemptive perspective differs
from the retributive perspective is the view taken of the relationship
between the transgressor and his society. Retributivism, especially as
politically mobilized in the last twenty-five years, has painted a
picture of transgressors as vicious predators or despicable weaklings.
Two stock characters are Willie Horton and the crack-addicted
mother. Willie Horton, who terrorized a Maryland couple while on
furlough from a Massachusetts prison, became the poster boy for
conservative criminal justice policies during and after his rhetorical
dominance of the Bush/Dukakis presidential race in 1988.91 Horton,
like addicted mothers who endanger and neglect their children
(including those helplessly gestating in the womb) is not at all like us.
We are the righteous and the vulnerable. People like Horton are
vicious and depraved. Even intellectual expressions of retributivism
tend to shrink the area of commonality of transgressors and lawabiding citizens to one dimension. Following Kant, retributivists
emphasize a kind of moral democracy: that the moral capacity to
choose responsibly is a characteristic shared by transgressor and good
citizen.
The redemptive perspective, which draws on the common
storehouse of Judeo-Christian norms and expectations, rejects the
Manichean division of people into good and evil. Consider again
Precious Bedell. Prior to her conviction, she was no worse if no
better a mother or father than legions of free citizens. In a few fateful
seconds, she demonstrated how badly an ordinary, responsible human
being-not a monster, not a defeated and hopeless addict-can fail.
From the redemptive perspective, free citizens are also mean, weak,
selfish, and takers of bad risks. And transgressors, like the rest of us,
have the potential for morally adequate lives and lives of high moral
achievement.
The redemptive view of the relationship between transgressor
and society also differs from the retributive perspective in its interest
in reconciliation. 92 From the redemptive perspective, the transgressor
91. Willie Horton repeatedly raped the wife while holding the couple hostage in their
home. See DAVID C. ANDERSON, CRIME AND THE POLITICS OF HYSTERIA: How THE WILLIE
HORTON STORY CHANGED AMERICAN JUSTICE (1995); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing
Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right to Privacy, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991).
92. See Garvey, supra note 90, at 1830-34 (making the acute point in discussing theories of
punishment that retributivists neglect reconciliation in their focus on punishment, while
advocates of restorative justice neglect retributive punishment in their focus on reintegration).
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is missed, the rehabilitated offender is needed. The redemptive
perspective, with its emphasis on community, may in some ways so
little resemble any modern nation-state, much less a vast and
heterogeneous country like the contemporary United States, as to
appear irrelevant. We are not today, like the founding generations, a
republic of hardy but interdependent yeoman farmers. Much less are
we like ancient Israel, a covenanted community whose God and law
require us to foster communal bonds. Nonetheless, there are
demonstrable ways in which reconciliation is a meaningful criminal
justice goal in contemporary circumstances. The reabsorption of
rehabilitated offenders, if achieved, would reduce crime rates,
recidivism rates, and crime control costs. At the community level,
especially in black and other poor minority communities where the
rates of incarceration are catastrophic, 93 the absent are needed to
cope with the ordinary, essential, economic, and social tasks of life.
At the political level, the transformation and restoration to
society of Precious Bedell has the potential to rival the impact of the
story of Willie Horton. Precious Bedell is a symbol of redemption
just as Horton is the poster boy for retribution. Horton, a black man,
was used to confirm and magnify fear of black criminality. The story
of Bedell, a black woman, her ordeal and her stature, undermines
facile assumptions. She represents the capacities of bad mothers,
thieves, and drug abusers to be good people-even heroes. As such,
her example carries a powerful healing message for people of all races
and classes.
Hope is also a redemptive criminal justice value: the example of
clemency for Precious Bedell would foster hope for release and
reconciliation among those willing to take on the rigors of selftransformation. 94 It is a fair question to ask the proponent of
clemency on grounds of rehabilitation whether the redemptive view
does not undermine equity in criminal punishment; concern for equity
united the many stripes of critics of the rehabilitation era of criminal
justice and remains a fundamental concern today. In a redemptive
system, a Precious Bedell and others with extraordinary resources
However, it is possible to adopt, as does Garvey himself, a redemptive orientation without
denying the role of punishment. I am presently agnostic about the role of state-inflicted
penitential suffering in redemptive criminal justice.
93. At year's end 1997, blacks were at least six times more likely than whites to be in state
or federal prison, and there were more black than white males in prison. See BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1998 (1999).
94. Warden Duffy of San Quentin was a proponent of the penology of hope. WARDEN
DUFFY, 88 MEN AND 2 WOMEN (1962).
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may receive lenity not accorded the less remarkable, but no more
reprehensible, felon. Of course, one answer to equity concerns would
be that the heart of the problem is not the discretionary use of the
executive power to grant clemency but the abolition of parole release
as a means of responding to cases of rehabilitation. Even more
fundamentally, no criteria for early release can possibly cure all the
abuses created by a system dedicated to locking away so many people
and for such long terms. Despite these considerations, equity
deserves fuller discussion. There is undeniably a tension between the
goal of equitable treatment and grants of clemency on grounds of
redemption. Redemptive clemency can best be defended against
criticism for derogating from equity by examining the functions of the
institution of clemency. Clemency has always been conceived, and
rightly so, as an extraordinary measure, a failsafe to redress system
failure and extraordinary cases. My defense of redemptive clemency
involves the rejection of proposals to bureaucratize clemency; I speak
against the seductions of enlarging due process and entitlements and
for executive discretion.
III. IN PRAISE OF UNRULY DISCRETION

Richard Kobil has proposed a radical constitutional reform of
Kobil distinguishes between "justice-enhancing" and
clemency.
"justice-neutral" uses of the clemency power.95 Justice-enhancing
clemency seeks to correct retributively unjust sentences, to free the
innocent and those suffering excessive punishment. Taking up a
proposal of former Illinois Governor Mike DiSalle, 96 Kobil proposes
that justice-enhancing clemency be placed under the authority of
commissions, buffered from the political process. Commissioners
would be selected by the executive, with the advice and consent of
either the judiciary or the legislature, and have life tenure. 97 Justiceneutral clemency pursues political objectives, as exemplified by
President Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon or President Carter's
amnesty of Vietnam era draft dodgers. The justice-neutral use of
clemency would remain a discretionary power of the executive. Thus,
the clemency power would be bifurcated: Ordinary criminal cases
would go to commissions, and the executive would remain
responsible for the political uses of the power.
95. Kobil, supra note 3, at 582-83.
96. See id. at 623.
97. See id. at 622-24.
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A clemency commission would develop and employ a set of neoretributive standards for the award of clemency. Applicants who met
the standards would be entitled to clemency and would be protected
by due process.
Kobil urges this scheme both out of commitment to neoretributivism and because he believes that if such commissions were
instituted, meritorious cases would more frequently be awarded
clemency and deserving prisoners would be offered relief. Prisoners
who could clear themselves through DNA evidence, for example, or
otherwise establish their innocence, would have greatly improved
chances under a clemency commission of gaining a fair and
expeditious hearing for their claims. 98 A commission would also
develop systematic information that allows meaningful relief for
prisoners whose sentences are excessively severe relative to norms for
their category of offenses or even relative to crimes of greater offense
severity.
It is plausible to suppose that the bureaucratization of the
clemency power would more reliably vindicate retributive values in
clemency decisions. Equally, it is plausible that an agency insulated
from politics and able to justify its decisions as applications of
impartial standards would grant more clemency than do
contemporary governors. Indeed, a governor interested in granting
more clemency might find political cover and achieve greater
consistency of practice by adopting some of the machinery of the
commission approach under the shelter of his or her discretion.
There are, however, several good reasons to resist the commission
proposal. 99
A clemency commission appears to be envisioned as a hybrid
sentencing commission/legislature/appellate court designed to mitigate the failure of twenty-five years of retributive policies of
overincarceration. The number of prisoners in American prisons is
fast approaching 1.5 million. 1°° The proportion of prisoners serving
98. See JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2000).
99. Some conversations with Sara S. Beale were very helpful to me in clarifying my
thinking about the status of clemency in contemporary criminal justice.
100. There were 1,302,019 persons in federal and state prisons at years end 1998; 1,825,000
persons were incarcerated if those in jail are tallied as well. The average annual rate of increase
in the prison population during the decade of the 1990s was 6.7%, and the increase in total
prison population during the 1990s exceeded 40%. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra
note 93, at 1. Prison populations grew even faster during the decade of the 1980s. See U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS 1997 (1997). See David Dolinko,

The Future of Punishment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1719 (1999), for a concise review of the
incarceration crisis.
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long and life terms increases annually.1°1 I am unpersuaded that the
blurring of legislative functions with the corrective, case-oriented
function of clemency would be a sound way of addressing the
overincarceration crisis. Nor am I persuaded that the evasion of
public and political reassessment of present policies is desirable. The
better way of addressing retributively-unjustified sentencing schemes
would be to reform sentencing law so that it more closely resembled
von Hirsch's least-incarceration approach. Until or unless legislatures
reverse present policies, it appears that the commissions would be
working at cross-purposes with legislatures.1°2
Historically, clemency has served at least two important
functions in ordinary criminal cases, both of which are best served by
preserving executive discretion. The last resort function is not
distinctly lodged in the executive -courts also fulfill this purpose.
Indeed, the overlap or redundancy is some indication of the
importance of the remediation function of clemency. The executive
performs the last resort function under a distinctive rationale or
political justification. When legislators, prosecutors, and courts have
failed to prevent injustice, the executive may intervene as an
incidence of sovereignty, as the representative of the people.
Clemency in these cases expresses the residual power of the sovereign
to prevent injustice otherwise suffered due to the ineffectualness,
indifference, malfeasance, or lack of imagination of other bearers of
public power, or due to gaps in jurisdiction in the system of formal
justice. It is an antibureaucratic and anti-institutional power. For this
reason, citizens may well disagree with a particular grant of clemency
because it does not comport with their normative views, and yet
endorse the power of the executive to intervene. In extraordinary
cases where institutionalized public power has failed to respond, there
is another avenue of redress: A direct appeal may be made to the
executive to examine the facts and the equities in a particular case.
The second historic function of clemency has been to facilitate
reform in standards of criminal liability.103 Novel claims of mitigation
not yet well enough developed to command integration into the
criminal law, in areas such as mental illness, have gained a foothold,
currency, and public attention through executive clemency. While it
is conceivable that a commission could also serve this function, a
101. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 31, at 1.
102. Kobil's proposal is presented as a brief sketch, not a detailed plan; the extent of the
power of the commission to contravene legislation is not discussed.
103. See Kobil, supra note 3.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1501

bureaucratic agency whose legitimacy rests on its fidelity to accepted
criminal justice norms is not well-positioned to respond to emergent
justice claims, or to justify innovation. The traditional discretionary
power to respond to the facts and equities in an individual case,
without committing the criminal justice system to full articulation and
defense of a new standard, is better suited to this role.
Kobil's commission model apparently normalizes clemencyrather than being an extraordinary remedy, clemency becomes
accessible to any prisoner with a retributively-based claim.
Commissions could, in effect, overrule legislation that lacks
retributive justification. Executive clemency is ill suited to be a
means to overcome wholesale legislative failures. Clemency granted
in exemplary cases of rehabilitation, such as the Bedell case, may
however, play a role in reopening the channels of politics to systemic
reform.
We come now to the question of the threat posed to horizontal
and vertical equity by any discretionary authority, and certainly the
traditional discretion of the executive in clemency determinations.
Should we seek to eliminate the executive's discretion to grant
clemency in recognition of redemption in order to preserve fairness to
those who are serving out full terms for similar offenses? The answer
to this question hinges at least in part on whether rehabilitation and
allied claims are legitimate grounds for clemency at all. Let us
suppose for the sake of pursuing the argument that redemptive claims
are legitimate and integral to a just punishment regime. The only way
to fully vindicate the neo-retributive Principle of Just Deserts, that
severity of the offense and the culpability of the offender are the sole
measures of just punishment, would be to frustrate the redemptive
component of justice in every case based on a rehabilitative claim.
The alternative is to recognize that, at least some of the time,
considerations of horizontal and vertical equity would have to give
way to redemptive values.
Because we value equity, and because we are mistrustful of
discretion, we resist giving up the retributive model of standards-notdiscretion for deciding cases. However, it is hardly surprising to find
that legitimate values in a complex institution like criminal justice
conflict, and that core values cannot always be simultaneously
vindicated in deciding a particular case. Making decisions in a
clemency case where rehabilitation is taken into account involves
weighing incommensurables -weighing, for example, equity against
rehabilitation through some process of judgment employing
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standards, intuition, precedents, experience, and background
knowledge. The use of discretion in clemency decisions and in other
complex judgments can only be denied at the cost of creating a fiction
that standards and their nearly mechanical application alone govern,
or through the exclusion of legitimate considerations in the service of
a reductionist program like retributivism. When we seek to banish
discretion, we impoverish justice and consort with comforting fictions.
The discretion of the executive to disturb retributive sentencing
uniformity in extraordinary cases should be retained.
As a proponent of executive clemency, discretionary and
multifactored, I support the requirement that most states place upon
their governors to make an annual public report accounting for their
use of the clemency power. 1' 4 Governors are required to explain the
reasons for each grant and denial. Discretion can give a better or
worse account of itself, and the body of cases and reasons ought to
exercise significant control over future practice. Such a record
provides a basis for criticism and even political repudiation of an
executive.
Discretion provides an opportunity for conscientious efforts to
do justice from a novel angle of vision or to protect a value that has
gotten short shrift in the reigning dispensation. Governors should be
encouraged to use this power rather than allow it to atrophy. Despite
the apprehension of abuse and the risks to the governors themselves
if they cannot make a case to the public for their actions, it is the
discretionary character of clemency that accounts for its importance
as an antibureaucratic source of redress and a means of innovation.

104. The majority of states have such requirements and also have various provisions for
notification of the public, victims, and criminal justice officials about a clemency application.
See Dome & Gewerth, supra note 4, at 436-38.

